Gernot Rohr: Dancing with the Wolves!

Watching Nigeria dominate Algeria in a 3-1 triumph, you get the unmistakable impression that German coach, Gernot Rhor might be on the cusp of building a young, dynamic team, with the attacking verve to trouble many teams.

But in two back to back games, his attempt at game management after establishing a dominant opening half, has left much to be desired, leaving open the clear possibility of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory!

The challenge of coaching Nigeria does not often weigh heavily on how to structure the attacking game, (unless you are an old school German coach, stuck in a time warp of rigid tactical systems like Herr Berti Vogts). Rather it is on how to organize the team in the non-possession phase and maximize it's natural dynamism in attack, without compromising balance.

So I choose to focus on the latter! While this was an important win, if you look at this game from the perspective of the Algerian attacking game, this was an inept Nigerian performance on the defensive side.

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In Pix 1 above, watch Bentaleb in the opening half burst into the box from deep unchallenged creating what should've been the equalizer in Pix 2.

Nigeria again played with a double pivot in central midfield, which meant that John Mikel Obi again played at the apex of the midfield triangle.

Clearly the introduction of Etebo alongside Onazi in central midfield enabled the team move a level up, but he needs guidance on the tactical side of his game, and the relationship between the two pivots needs to improve. In addition, his major skills set requires the design of plays that enables him surge into the box from deep, and unbalance rigid defensive lines. It would be unfortunate to take that side of his game away...

But more importantly, the gap between Mikel and the two pivots is dangerously wide, and seems to grow in geometric proportion with a match, as the Chelsea man's lack of proper conditioning increasingly manifests.

In the screenshots below, watch Mikel's position in the lead up to Bentaleb's goal.

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And herein lies the main object of my concerns with Rohr's game management and rather feeble attempts at positioning for the counterattack on establishing a lead.

It took 73mins to finally make a sub (Anderson for Ideye) well after Zambia had snatched control of the game and deservedly scored. Ten minutes later, Musa would come on for a thoroughly ineffective Simon, by which time, Nigeria had stabilized the game...

Against Algeria, outside the injury enforced substitution of Omeruo on 66mins, it took 77mins to try to seriously address the Algerian second half dominance, with Ndidi's introduction finally bringing some stability and creating the foundation for the counterattack by Musa that led to the third goal.

As I've often said, when a team plays it leaves tactical footprints on the field. There are clear tactical problems with the Nigerian midfield. We need to address these before the decisive games against Cameroon that will decide who qualifies from the group.

In attack, the decision to start Iheanacho at the top of the attack, initially suggested to me to be a design at maximizing fluidity and flexibility between the attacking trio. But throughout the game, his starting position did not change much and rather exposed most of the limitations in his game that the coaching staff at Man City are still working on. Iheanacho needs to arrive in the box not be fixated in it or looking to hold up play with back to box. There are still too many technical leftovers in his game for this to be effective.

On a final note, can we please cut out the excesses? There is no need for the showboating and other such unprofessional habits that none of these players would exhibit at Arsenal, Chelsea or Lazio...

Zambia vs Nigeria: A tactical Review

Nigeria and Zambia played out an entertaining and a typically high energy African game at the Levy Mwanawasa Stadium in Ndola, with the Super Eagles off to a great start.

Two goals from, first Iwobi and then a superb finish by Iheanacho, from a brilliantly constructed team play saw Nigeria race to a two-goal lead. Zambia would come back in the second half, but Nigeria held on to win.

1. Defensive Organization:
Nigeria started with Ndidi at right-back and Omeruo in place of Balogun at centerback, with a defensive line in low to medium block, but shifting occasionally. This particularly denied Mbesuma and Zambia the ball-over-the-top option, but Kalengo did find the occasional joy attacking from wide, especially on the Nigerian right.

Gaps between the Lines and a Tactical Disconnect:
The key defensive issue for Nigeria was the over exposure of the fullbacks in open play, and crucially, gaps between the lines when Zambia switched from wide to attack diagonally. Two things were responsible for this.

(i) The disconnect between Onazi's role as the first line of pressure in central midfield and Mikel's role further upfield.
(ii) the lack of sustained and effective cover from the wide midfielders, Simon and Iwobi.

Poor Rotation in the Non-Possession Phase:
Related to (i) above, Mikel repeatedly failed to rotate into the space vacated by Onazi, a direct result of his positioning further upfield and the well known weakness of his lateral movement. This meant that beyond the press, gaps remained in front of the Nigerian defence, which Mbesuma exploited very well playing with back to goal, or Kalengo, to lesser effect, on the dribble run.

Poor rotation especially manifested itself in the second half during a period of sustained Zambian pressure, with Mbesuma again key; receiving the ball with back to goal and then executing the give and go, with no corresponding movement from the Nigerian midfield to pick up the runner from deep.

This proved to be Zambia's main attacking weapon, and moving forward, Nigeria needs to address this. There also needs to be better understanding of positional roles between the wide players and fullbacks, and where best to channel the opposition wide player.

Overall, the team looked increasingly lethargic in the rotation of the zonal formation from the strong to weak side. A more adept team at crossfield switch will find and perhaps exploit better this weakness of the Nigerian team.

The Counterpress:
Even recognizing the challenges of executing this in the conditions in Ndola, the Nigerian team needs to organize better in this phase. As Eddy Murphy said in  the movie Harlem Nights, 'its not how many you shoot, but who you shoot'. Similarly, its often not how much you press, but who you press. As I had written about years ago, Sinkala in central midfield remained a rich target for the counterpress and it was disappointing to see Nigeria repeatedly pass up on the opportunity.

Lateral Defense: A Continuing Work in Progress:
Ndidi started in place of Musa Mohammed at right back and in spite of his efforts, was clearly the weak link in the Nigerian defence. On the left, Echiejile did well in shutting down Tembo, but struggled as the game wore on in the second half, and offered little in attacking the spaces being created out wide by Iwobi's diagonal movement.

If he is reading this, Amaju Pinnick and the NFF Technical Committee must as a matter of urgency step forward to support Mikel's attempt to recruit Chelsea's young right-back, Ola Aina. Although on the fringes of the first team, Aina is a fundamentally sound defender, with a good understanding of the role.

The other defender of interest is Kevin Akpoguma, who plays as a centerback for Fortuna Dusseldorf in Bundesliga 2. He is 1.92 metres (6’4in), has speed, good technique and is a dynamic player and was a 2013 Fritz-Walter gold medal winner for the best German players of U17, U18 and U19. He started out his career as a right back but he has played his best football for his current team at CB. He will take some strong recruiting effort, but would be a GREAT asset to this young emerging team.

2. Attacking Game: 3v1 in Midfield.
As expected, the Nigerian team was strong in the attacking phase, with good rotation, repeatedly outnumbering a clueless Zambian team in midfield, and you got the sense, on a better pitch and better conditions, could've inflicted even greater damage. This was indeed Nigeria's real strength and Rohr and his crew must have taken great satisfaction in how the team is coming along in this area.

Of the two wide midfielders, Simon had the wider role in the first half, and although he saw a lot of the ball, did not do enough to stretch the play, and his final ball was often lacking. I expect Moses to replace Simon in a similar role and considerably upgrade the team.

The Nigerian attack was especially effective when the passing and movement was uptempo, with frequent switching of the point of attack and rotation of players. But it clearly showed its work in progress in controlled possession phase, lacking the movement and patience to complete moves and twice gifting Zambia a chance on the counter.

Even of greater concern, was the inability of the team to develop counterattacking opportunities in the second half especially, even with an abundance of pace upfront. And often having pulled the Zambian defence into a central block, never could find the pass for effective blind-side runs behind the Chipolopolo defence.

3. Game Management:
The Zambian push-back in the second half was always expected, and overall, Nigeria did well to hold on and secure a win on the road, never an easy thing in the continent, with sometimes atrocious conditions.

However what was unexpected was Gernot Rohr's timidity in responding to changing events in real time, rather than live on hope and holding the course. Clearly the Nigerian team was starting to tire on the hour mark, especially in midfield under hot and humid conditions. At right-back, Ndidi was increasingly struggling, with Simon's efforts at support hardly sufficient.

It seemed that among other things, a slight adjustment in Kelechi's position to bring him closer to Mikel and Onazi could've helped the course of "controlled possession", which the team appeared to have set out to accomplish in that half. And the one time this tactic came through successfully, Ideye failed to take the chance that would've ended the game as a contest. That was Brown Ideye in a nutshell- never quite there!

What's more, his inability to effectively hold up play, meant the team couldn't follow through on to the second phase of the attack. Nigeria must continue to develop all aspects of its team and personnel, and must never be satisfied too soon.

4. Continued Team Development:
We must keep looking for options to improve the team or present multiple options for national team selectors. In attack we need to keep an eye for young players like Awoniyi and Osimhen, especially the latter. We need additional options in goal, fullbacks and central defence.

For the first time in a while, their appears to be the beginnings of some sort of sustained stability in the Super Eagles. Pinnick must work hard to build on this...

Reflecting further on the match, and as a long time follower of the African game, this was a disappointing Zambian team, with ageing players and a failure to reinvent itself.

Zambia vs Nigeria: 5 Key Points

Nigeria meets Zambia in the Africa World Cup Qualifiers on Sunday October 9 at Ndola, in a game of two African greats struggling to re-establish themselves in the continent.

For Nigeria and German coach Gernot Rohr these are the five key tactical points in previewing the game:

1. How high will the defensive line be. Will Nigeria set up in a low or medium block?
Against an average Tanzania side, Nigeria sought to press the ball with modest results, primarily as a result of haphazard organization behind the first line of the press. On the road, it will be interesting to see how brave Rohr will be, especially considering that the Zambian attack is not particularly endowed with great pace. Conversely, many in the Nigerian back-four are of average speed.

African team football, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, is based first on expressive individual technique and spontaneous creativity. While this can sometimes be devastating in the final third, it also leaves massive room for turnover of possession. This is why I have often maintained that teams with a modicum of compact organization and a threat of the counterattack, will always make hay in the continent, as we see with Cape Verde currently.

2. What will be the team's structure in midfield? Specifically, what will be the position of Mikel Obi? How close will the lines be in the non-possession phase?
Starting especially with Samson Siasia's Olympics team, Mikel's position has surprisingly moved further upfield, and Rohr appears to have continued with this. This has good and bad sides. On the positive side, it gives Nigeria a platform, high in the opposition half to retain possession technically, without loss of the ball, in the second or third phase of the build up.

On the downside however, it slows the team down and reduces the fluidity of the team. I am clearly not a fan of this move...I think that Nigeria is better served with Mikel in his Chelsea role, as a screen in front of the back-four in an inverted triangle.

3. How close will be the lines between the defenders, especially between the CDs and the fullbacks?
Zambia typically look to play quickly through midfield, interspersed with the long ball behind the fullbacks especially, with Mbesuma and Kalongo often spreading wide. But the key to unbalancing a close defensive line is Rainford Kalaba. I will especially be watching the performance of Musa Mohammed at right back and how well the centerbacks squeeze the space behind the fullbacks.

As Nigeria looks to recover with Rohr as the new manager, it is imperative that efforts be made to look for options in defence, and there are quite a few. But it will require strong diplomacy and proper scouting, especially in the local league.

4. Related to #3 above, what will be the starting position of the wide midfielders? What will be the default pattern of movement in the attacking phase?
I raise this especially because Nigeria's best options in this position, have often not been renowned for their defensive contribution. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, many of them (excluding Moses) play decidedly more advanced roles than they are made to play in the Super Eagles, a good example being Ahmed Musa, who is no longer a winger, but repeatedly placed in that role for Nigeria.

I am equally interested in observing the positioning of Alex Iwobi, whose great, great quality is his movement between the lines. What will their role definition reveal- more tradition, stasis or greater fluidity?

5. Who replaces Odion Ighalo?
Watching Ighalo play for Nigeria often leaves me with some conflict. Clearly the most established Nigerian center forward, but an old school forward who thrives best with an attacking partner, in the middle of an attacking trio of quick and flexible forwards. Not necessarily a negative, if the lines of movement around him is better defined...

Brown Ideye is suggested as the odds on favorite to start. In my considered opinion, the quickly Rohr moves away from options such as these, the better for Nigeria. Brown may get you a goal or two, eventually, but best not to resurrect ghosts....

Egypt vs Nigeria: A Tactical Preview

1. Samson Siasia has always been one of my favorites, of the new generation of Nigerian coaches emerging from the 1994 class of internationals, largely for his philosophy of a Nigerian attacking game. But his football has always been undermined by a lack of tactical balance, as I addressed here five years ago! Its not necessarily the number of attacking players you have on the pitch that gives you offensive impetus...

2. If Siasia can be persuaded to control his instincts and develop a game plan based on structured possession in midfield, and skillful control of tempo, Nigeria has the ability to get a win on the road against this Egyptian team.

3. Based on a 4-1-4-1, this is what I would recommend, assuming Omeruo was to become available.

4. At left back, whoever gets to start and thus has the task of marking Salah would focus defensive duties, strictly on channeling him down the line, with Onazi starting in central midfield-left, to occupy the inside channel.

5. The key strategy to the tactical organization, is structured control in midfield and control of the tempo of the game. That is why Mikel starts in a deep role, with Onazi and Etebo just ahead of him. Such a 'quarterback role' creates the space to enable Mikel play to his strength, in helping keep the shape of the team in the non-possession phase, while retaining the ability to telegraph quick breakaways with the precision long ball.

6. More importantly, this creates a 3v2 in central midfield, with the flexibility to shift towards the ball, with Mikel as anchor of an inverted triangle, and a shape to enable a controlled possession game.

7. Onazi starts on the left to create a strong left side, to both shadow Mohammed Salah as well as create the platform to exploit the space behind the Egyptian on the counter, which is why Musa starts on the left.

8. To the right of Etebo, Iheanacho starts in what is an advanced 'holding role', and an outlet to retain the ball higher up the pitch, and deliver through balls to Ighalo and Musa, as well as to push up besides the lone striker when necessary.

9. Musa takes up the widest role, of the four midfielders ahead of Mikel, and in position to attack the space behind Mohammed Salah, given the Egyptian's penchant for neglecting his defensive duties. The role also enables the team push Musa up to play as second striker, with the pace to get behind the defence to exploit Ighalo's knockdowns and hold up play.

10. Despite the criticisms from the last game, I would absolutely start Ighalo in attack. He brings a crucial ability to hold up play in a difficult road game, as well as the space awareness to run the channels. However it is crucial that Siasia build support around him, especially with Musa and Iheanacho, as he thrives best in a partnership.

11. Equally important, I would use Ighalo, along with Musa, to relentlessly press the Egyptian centerbacks, especially Hamada Tolba and goalie. But they would need to pick their time wisely...

12. Such a pressing regime is designed to force early release of the ball and constrain a structured build-up from the back. Forced release of the ball into central midfield would increase the chances the Super Eagles have of exploiting their advantage in numbers, and enhancing their ability to dominate space, even if not possession.

13. From the bench, Victor Moses and Alex Iwobi can be used to change the tempo of the game, with the young Arsenal player especially useful in forcing turnovers and breaking away from deep.

14. Finally, it would be remiss of me to finish this without mentioning the dastardly role that successive NFF leaderships, including the current one, have repeatedly played in undermining the stable development of the Nigerian national team. In a period of six years, these men, have undermined the ability of Nigeria to develop three of her best young managers, through outright subterfuge (Keshi), intrigue, as well as incompetence.

15. This is why there is a sense in me that perhaps, Siasia should've declined the request to take over the team in an interim position. Perhaps then, the likes of Chris Green would finally get a chance to show us the technical wizardry that lurks in the recesses of a mediocre intellect!

Oliseh's Super Eagles Emerging; Somewhat....

Two friendlies against Congo DR and Cameroon begin to show clearer the footprints of Oliseh's tenure as coach of the Super Eagles.

The most visible imprints lie in the possession phase of the game, specifically in the build-up stage, with a focus on a more methodical approach, especially in midfield.

The loss against Congo DR showed a team with sterile possession, lacking the right tempo and movement to endow its passing game with cutting edge in the last third.

An improved performance against Cameroon led to a 2-0 win, albeit with a little help from a 'compliant' Indomitable Lions team, and Stephen M'bia at his daft best!

Two major tactical issues stand out from both matches:

Considerable work still remains to be done in organization of the team in the non-possession phase, especially in central midfield. Lacking any truly creative midfielders, successive managers have in recent times looked to Mikel to assume greater responsibilities upfield. The impact has often been a concomitant loss of his best qualities from his club career, as the 'keeper of the team shape'...

In my opinion, we should consider restructuring the shape in central midfield with Mikel in a deeper role, in a 1-2 inverted triangle shape. Such a move must necessarily recognize that Igboun is not a midfielder but a forward; specifically a wide forward.

While the spacing between players has improved, you get the sense that sterner opposition will expose the frailties of the team's organization. In many respects, spacing in football has interesting parallels with a lady's mini skirt! Long enough to cover the essential parts, but short enough to be attractive...

There is a lack of consistency in the spacing between players, with the result that the team does not dominate space as well as it could, there are not enough lines of support around the ball and the tempo of the passing game remains lukewarm.

Related to the structural issues is continuing problems of the quality of options available to the team. As stated earlier, the use of Igboun in midfield is a disservice to both the player and the team. Although energetic, Onazi often does not display the same level of tactical awareness, while a player in left midfield is completely lacking in this selection.

In defence, the performance of Balogun as a 'front foot' centerback was very encouraging. If he is to remain in the role however, a powerful stopper is required behind him. While Omeruo has the potential to fill such a role, his recent performance and continuing lack of first team football is clear evidence of the merit in Oliseh's selection policy.

Recurring gaps from undefended zones continue to persist behind the lateral defence, especially on the right where the lack of a quality is palpable.

It is hard to see Oliseh's rebuilding project succeed and the small improvements made so far sustained without sufficiently addressing the problems in central defence.

In attack there needs to be clearer definition of lines of movement, as well as the requisite support around the ball, whether attacking diagonally or when stretching the field wide.

I continue to believe in the long term merits of Oliseh's selection policy. There will be those who will criticize this policy as naive, not practical or sustainable. I couldn't disagree more! A team whose players are selected simply on the basis of past performance or club profile, is a team living on borrowed time. . 

But the flip side of this is that Oliseh must back this up by an aggressive search for the players to match his philosophy of the game. Such an aggressive mindset would need to ignore the club profile of players, or phony classifications of age grades....

The Challenge of Rebuilding the Super Eagles

Two games do not normally constitute enough body of work to assess the performance of a coach, and I will not attempt to do so with respect to Sunday Oliseh's tenure so far.

However, his much publicized selection policy is of interest to me, especially because of the vital role that this has played in the failures of successive Nigerian coaches of the Super Eagles.

The pool of players available to national team selectors in Nigeria can be divided into four broad categories.

The first pool of players comprises established national team players among whom are the following: Enyeama,  Ambrose, Omeruo, Oboabona, Uwa; Mikel Obi, Onazi; Emenike, Musa, Moses.

The challenge for national team selectors is the fact that apart from Enyeama who has played at a consistently high level, the rest of this group have had their careers either stagnate, become inconsistent or out-rightly decline.

The second pool comprises fringe players who have made periodic appearances in the national team. This comprises a long list of players some of whom are Ejide, Egwueke, Oshaniwa, Kwambe, Raheem Lawal, John Ogu, Aaron Samuel, Obiora Nwankwo, Gbolahan Salami, Rabiu Ibrahim, Michael Babatunde, etc.

The difficulty for national team selectors in assessing this group is the clear lack of consistency in the careers of many of these players, with several shuttling between the NPL and trials in Europe. Under Keshi, For example, under Stephen Keshi, Oshaniwa made his debut and remained a regular until his international transfer, after which he seemed to disappear, only to return and feature prominently at the world cup, following an injury to Echiejile. Others have shuttled between minor clubs in the low tier European leagues.

The biggest challenge for national team selectors especially resides within this group, with many of the Euro-based players having had nomadic careers, shuttling between minor leagues, and their homebased counterparts navigating successive failed trials in Europe. The result is that few from this group have had settled careers, and overall have contributed least to the national team, compared to other groups. 

In my considered opinion, any call-ups from this group will need to be made with the most careful consideration. An analysis of call-ups by Sunday Oliseh so far shows that invitees from this group includes, Lukman Haruna, Sylvester Igboun, Izunna Uzochukwu, Rabiu Ibrahim, Obiora Nwankwo and Solomon Kwambe. None of these players have put in anything resembling a quality performance.

What is more, under Stephen Keshi and Siasia before him, players from this group have equally performed poorly, especially under the former. Analyzing this group further, one can conclude with certainty that the stagnation that followed Keshi's performance post-ANC 2013 can be traced to his repeated call-ups and persistence with players from this group, even when their contributions did not warrant a recall. The highlight of this being the notorious case of Gabriel Okechukwu including the decision to go to the world cup with the likes of Michael Uchebo, Reuben Gabriel and Uche Nwofor. Indeed, ten of Nigeria's world cup squad was drawn from this group!

The third pool of players comprise some emerging talent from both the domestic as well as European leagues, comprising such players as Moses Simon, Leon Balogun, William-Troos Ekong, Ighalo, Ujah, Kingsley Madu, Prince Aggrey, Mohmmed Usman, etc.

The fourth and final pool of players comprise players from our youth teams, many of whom are yet to make their international debuts with the Super Eagles, as well as diaspora Nigerians (including those with Nigerian parentage). Among these are such talents as Kelechi Iheanacho, Taiwo Awoniyi, Genk center-back, Wilfred Ndidi, Michael Olaitan, Godswill Ekpolor, Kelvin Akpoguma, Kenneth Otigba, etc.

The challenge for Sunday Oliseh and national team selectors is to focus player call-ups on players whose growth curve is trending upwards, wherever they may be domiciled, regardless of what experience they may have or how young they may claim. 

Perhaps the greatest irony of Nigerian football is the fact that at any one time, the best players from the Nigerian domestic game can be found in any one of our youth teams. And when they perform brilliantly at this level, we delude ourselves into thinking they are too young for the senior team!

Take the case of Stanley Okoro, who at the time of his superstar status with the U-17 'Golden Eaglets' was a top scorer for Heartland in the CAF Champions league, ostensibly considered 'too young' for the Super Eagles even when his standard was at least at the top end of the African club championship! The result was that he would go from playing in the finals of the CAF champions league to the reserves at Spanish basement club Almeria, as an academy scholar! From Almeria he would be sent on a season long loan in 2013 to the anonymous Bulgarian team, Cherno More. Nothing more has been heard of him since then...

The moral of the above story is that the only victims of our approach to youth football is Nigeria. Many of the players we parade from the U-17 to the U-23 levels are some of the best players in the domestic game in their positions, including some of those strategically 'parked' at our local academies to facilitate their international transfers.

While the MRI test might analyze the bone density of our players and certify them eligible for the U-17 team, they will not, and cannot reveal the iniquities underlying an approach that wastes some of the best years of our most talented footballers, like Macauley Chrisantus, top scorer and Silver Boot winner at the  2007 FIFA U-17 World Cup in Korea, a veteran of European basement league football at 25, having migrated from Hamburger SV to Hamburger SV II, Karlsruher SC, FSV Frankfurt, Las Palmas, Sivasspor and AEK Athens!

In the very short period of Sunday Oliseh's tenure, there are some encouraging signs from his selection policy and decisions, specifically his decision to set standards and his decisiveness in holding Lukman Haruna accountable for his disastrous performance in Tanzania. However, aspects of his selection decisions so far point unequivocally in the direction of the locust years of Stephen Keshi.

From the foregoing analysis, it seems crystal clear to me that to succeed, Sunday Oliseh must draw the majority of his national team call-ups from a viable core of established players in combination with high performers from the third and fourth selection pools outlined above. 

More importantly, it is vital that irrespective of the group a player is drawn from, that subsequent call-ups be made to reflect performance and accountability, not wishful thinking or worse, the desire to facilitate the international transfer of players.

Protecting the African Child, Patrice Sousia: Whose Interest FIFA?

I wrote a piece on FIFA's sanction of Barcelona's La Masia about a year and half ago, titled In the Best Interest of the African Child

In the piece I had wondered how much of the interests of the African child the rules on the international transfer of minors, FIFA's regulation actually protects:

It appears presumptuous and arrogant and puts FIFA in the unlikely position where it assumes to know better than Bukola Mosunmola and Ademola Adekanye, what is in the best interest of  their son Bobby Adekanye.
More importantly, it is ineffective because it doesn't address the two major mechanisms through which African minors are exploited in the transfer market, fraudulent agency representation and slave contracts, both of which continue, irrespective of the age of the player!
With specific reference to Barcelona, it is  rather ironic that a law that is designed to prevent the exploitation of minors, is punishing a team, whose facilities and conditions of work, as well as the management of young players is probably of the highest standard in the world.

But even I, skeptical as I was could never have foretold what would become of one of the young players, Patrice Sousia of Cameroon, who has suddenly found himself on the streets, homeless! This, as a result of FIFA's sanction, in not only preventing him from playing for Barcelona, in both friendlies and competitive games, but also in training, and wait for it, living at La Masia!

The result of the eviction was that Patrice Sousia suddenly found himself homeless and had to be rescued by the parents of one of his teammates.

So I ask again, whose interest is FIFA protecting in this sorry saga, because it sure as hell is not Patrice Sousia's?