Charting a New Direction for Nigerian Football: The Goal Project

Following the failure to qualify for the Nations Cup, Nigerian football is once again challenged to look seriously at its shortcomings and find new mechanisms to generate sustainable growth in the system. In my opinion, the Nigeria Goal project has the potential to fundamentally change the domestic game from the grassroots upwards.

At its meeting on 1 May 2003, the FIFA Goal Bureau added Nigeria to the list of beneficiaries of the Goal Programme. FIFA then constituted a team from the Goal Bureau led by Cameroonian, Jean Manga to review Nigeria’s plans under this laudable programme. The indication by the NFF was that it wanted to concentrate on youth football and intended to intensify its efforts in this area.

The NFF proposed to establish regional centres as a base for recruiting and training the best players in the various age groups. Before these centres are put in place, it was planned that coaches will be educated in preparation for their role as talent scouts. However, there was no indication in the plan how these coaches would be trained.

The weakness of this approach was obvious from the start. The truth is that the main promoters of grassroots youth football in Nigeria lie outside the NFF and state federations.

Grassroots football in Nigeria is alive and well by virtue of its non-reliance on government subsidies. There is however a glaring shortage of qualified coaches, equipments, including playing surfaces, and requisite programs for proper training and monitoring of youth footballers.

More importantly, there is a lack of coordination of programmes and harmonization of training methodology to avoid a situation where academies exist merely to facilitate the sale of players abroad.

To simply construct regional centres does not begin to address the needs of this crucial sub-sector of Nigerian football.

1. First there is need to put in place, a structure within the NFF for collaborating with the youth leagues, associations and clubs that proliferate in such cities as Lagos, Kaduna, Port Harcourt, Aba, Benin, Warri, etc. An easy solution might be to adopt the organizational framework of the Pepsi Academy, and site the Regional Centres at their principal locations. It would then require that all other youth organizations be given the same access to these facilities and its resources. It is suggested as follows:

1. Establish a youth department at the NFF with requisite infrastructure
2. Mandate all grassroots associations and youth clubs to register with the department, AT NO COST; providing basic information on club and especially the bio-data of players, programs, etc. this will need to be phased, starting with Lagos and moving progressively to other cities.
3. Through consultation, synchronize the competition calendar of the grassroots programmes and clubs across the various regions and then nationally.

Thus, the primary goal of this department would be to serve as a coordinating body for youth football in Nigeria, streamlining calendars, facilitating the use of the Centres, providing coaches and other technical resources, and maintaining a database. The implication of this is that the actual implementation of the programmes for youth football will remain with the promoters of grassroots football. This is crucial, as government intervention through the NFF will ultimately destroy this fledgling sub-sector of our football.

2. Establish the Goal Project’s national technical centre (NTC) as the primary institutional basis for the program. In my opinion, the Regional Centres can only be successful if a strong NTC is first put in place with requisite infrastructure. But more importantly, the NTC needs to be established as a training centre for producing youth team coaches who can then be deployed to the regional centres to identify and train talented youths in their regions, and recommend the best prospects to the national level.

To build regional centres without addressing key programmatic issues in the youth sub-sector just does not cut it. In the end, such regional centres will join several other white elephant projects that have been abandoned and today litter the Nigerian landscape.

The Nigeria Goal Project needs to be restructured as a vehicle for sustainable development of youth football in Nigeria. More importantly, a program needs to be effectively put in place, involving the key drivers of the youth football sub-sector in Nigeria, so that the regional centres are able to truly address the needs for which they are created.

3. Thirdly, the Project should seek the assistance of the FIFA Goal Committee in funding the recruitment of a technical partner to run the programme. Such a coach should be one that is experienced in developmental programmes of this nature, and many are available that can be recommended by the FIFA Technical department. A good place to look for such a coach would be the Ajax Academy or the Brazilian Academy.

4. With the technical partner and in consultation with the youth clubs, streamline and adopt a synchronized training regime, including formation for all youth clubs and national teams, from U-17 to the U-23..

5. Develop a system of incentives and support services for the clubs, including playing kits. The Adidas contract should have a provision through which to fund this, and indeed other aspects of this programme. If one does not exist, then requisite sponsorship for such should be developed.

6. As stated earlier, through the FIFA Goal Bureau, the NFF should use the Goal Project to recruit an experienced foreign coach as a technical partner, primarily to develop and execute the programs of the NTC, along the lines of the recent recommendation of its technical committee.

7. In addition to this, the NFF should invoke the relevant section of the CAF ‘Contract with Africa’ and develop a funding proposal to CAF to finance the administration of this program.

8. The Technical Director should, in addition to his primary responsibilities, also provide technical assistance to the senior national team, and assume a back-room advisory role during such tournaments as the Africa Nations Cup and the World Cup. This way, the direct day to day management of the national team is left with a local coach who is made to grow with the team.

9. But more importantly, this initiative requires that Nigeria invest in a new generation of coaches, with emphasis on players with experience of European football as well as others with demonstrated ambition to excel in the profession. However for each of these ex-footballers, a minimum qualification should be the CAF or UEFA license, which can be secured even while on the job, but subject to a specified deadline. The CAF ‘Contract with Africa’ and its coaching program offers the best prospects for enhancing the capability of coaches already involved in youth football, and streamlining youth coaching under this program.

Changes in the management of football, including the transfer system resulting from the Bosman ruling in Europe has made the entry level into the European league much more difficult than a few years ago. The availability of quality players from Eastern Europe has further restricted the availability of places for African players. The result is that too many of our talented players are forced to remain in the lower leagues of Europe in such places as Malta, Albania, Latvia, Cyprus, with many ultimately lost to the game.

The long term future of Nigerian football therefore lies in developing the domestic game, especially at the youth level.

Nigeria-Zambia: Good Result, Poor Performance

It has been said before that football is a funny old game. To that I will add that football always tells you the truth. What part of it you choose, is your own 'selenge', to borrow a Nigerian slang..

In his second game in charge, Nigeria overcame a hardworking Zambian team 2-0. You can look at the final result and shout 'uhuru', with some legitimacy, I might add. In the end football is about results.

But you could also look further, and legitimately too. You could, while accepting the result (thank you very much) look at the relative ease with which Zambia dominated Nigeria in midfield and the attempt to address this without much success by the coaching crew and be concerned. Afterall a team doesn't become bad in one day. It becomes bad from repeated failure to address a festering sore.

Whereas against Botswana, the Super Eagles faced the challenge of overcoming a team which opted to standoff in midfield, retreat into a deep defensive shape and counterattack, today the challenge was how to deal with a proactive, aggressive team, which opted to repeatedly pressure the ball all over the field, winning back the ball again and again and dominating play.

Nigeria started the game, like Zambia in a 4-3-3 formation. While its execution might vary from team to team, the whole concept of the 4-3-3 is based on an aggressive, proactive and fluid approach, with the three lines used to constantly pressure the opponent.

In deploying a 4-3-3, Stephen Keshi's team suprisingly lacked a proactive approach, with wide gaps between the lines, and the defence sitting deep. The front trio hardly pressured the opponent, allowing Zambia time and space to play out of defence. The lack of pressure and fluidity in movement in midfield allowed Zambia to consistently find the extra man to execute triangles in central midfield, or deliver the outlet ball to the fullbacks pushing forward unchallenged.

Defensively, the inability of the flank players to play in the non-possession phase, left the fullbacks completely exposed, with undefended zones on the inside and outside.

The coaching crew recognized this early, and switched to a 4-4-2, with Ogude making way for Uche. Sadly this switch would worsen the situation, with Uche making little impact until his brilliant individual effort for the second goal.

In my considered opinion, Nigeria currently lack the personnel to execute the modern 4-4-2 formation and successfully maintain the defensive integrity of the team, especially in wide areas in the non-possession phase. As in the last game, Kalu Uche continues to play in only one phase of the game. While his goal was well taken, especially in terms of his positioning, he contributed nothing in the non-possession phase, which allowed Zambia to repeatedly push Musonda up, or execute a triangle around Taiwo, with Mbesuma dropping wide and often behind the left back.

The overall effect was that our game lacked clear definition in terms of movement, passing and support systems, with Emenike and Obi at one point running into each other with the Zambian goal at their mercy.

On the offense, the attacking game was being developed almost entirely on the ability of players, especially Musa, to win 1v1 duels, with very little corresponding movement being made around him, either to pull defenders out or present multiple options beyond the crossed ball. Again and again, the team retreated to the familar long ball for an isolated Emenike to chase, with little support from the midfield or widebacks.

In defensive midfield, the familar weaknesses of Etuhu were self evident, repeatedly losing possession as Zambia pressed the ball, and failing to provide cover, either for the centerback who is drawn out of defence, or even to cover the zones behind the fullbacks. In a 4-3-3 formation, the central player in the midfield trio, among other things, provides cover for the defence in winning back the ball, as well as provide a continuing outlet to enable rapid ball circulation. He did neither.

Let there be no misunderstanding though. This is not about playing pretty patterns without cutting edge in the final third. Its about organization and efficiency.

But the good news is that these are early days and a victory such as this can only breed confidence moving forward.

Verdict:

Nigeria: A festering sore can be papered over and still look good. But it won't stop it from decaying on the inside. Good result, poor performance...

Interesting cameo for Ugo Ukah, with his resemblance of Uche Okechukwu. Hope to see more.....

Zambia: Could have and should have done a lot more with its territorial dominance. Result reinforces the stereotype of the typical Zambia team that is easy on the eye, but lacking cutting edge in the final third.

NIGERIA: 1. Vincent ENYEAMA (Ejide); Efe AMBROSE (Okonkwo), Taye TAIWO, Joseph YOBO (c), Dele Adeleye (Ugo Ukah); Dickson Etuhu, Fengor OGUDE (Ike Uche), Joel OBI; Kalu UCHE (Nosa Igiebor), Ahmed Musa, Emmanule Emenike (Jude Aneke)

ZAMBIA: K Mweene, F Kasonde, S Sunzu, N Mulenga, J Musonda, C Katongo, W Njobvu, F Katongo, C Mbesuma, E Mayuka, R Kalaba

POSTSCRIPT:

Following the game, coach Stephen Keshi commented as follows:

“(Against Zambia) we lost the midfield because Fegor (Ogude) was injured and had to go off. Etuhu was fagged out from playing two games in three days and there was no replacement,” he disclosed while assuring on the defence..

“I had like 10 strikers today and I was looking for midfielders to play but I couldn’t find them. I can’t put a striker on as a midfielder.

“I need to have the numbers of players in every department that will allow me change players if one is not doing well. Today I could not do it. I was trying to juggle with it. I won’t overhaul the team, but I will make sure that for every 18 or 25 we get to camp, there are twins in every position.” Link

All due respects to coach Keshi, especially recognizing that he did not select the squad and had not been hired when the list for the two friendlies was published, but this is an incorrect assessment.

First, Zambian domination in midfield began long before the departure of Ogude and was a product of the effectiveness of their pressing system, the weakness of Nigeria in possession, and the poor tactical organization of the team. If the team was indeed tired from playing two games in three days, he still had the option of adjusting the spacing of the players and the tempo of the game.

Second, Keshi did indeed put on a striker for a midfielder in bringing in Ike Uche for the injured Fengor Ogude.

Third, he did have Hapoel Tel Aviv central midfielder Nosa Igiebor on the bench and could've introduced him much earlier.

Fourth, he had the additional option of Dynamo Kyiv midfielder, Yusuf Ayila, who plays multiple positions in midfield and defence.

But overall, his point about the lack of balance in the squad is right on the money. I am not sure however if you necessarily need two players in every position to achieve the versatility that he desires.

Nigeria-Botswana Match Review

1. Stephen Keshi in his first game earns a goalless draw with Botswana. He starts the game by resorting to a 4-4-2 formation, with Dickson Etuhu and Fengor Ogude in central midfield, as well as Joel Obi and Kalu Uche in right and left midfield respectively. He would revert to a 4-3-3 with the departure of Ehiosun and Kalu in the second half.

2. Predictably Nigeria dominated possession for long periods and as expected, Botswana defended deep, with numbers and shape, and with five players strung across midfield.

3. In terms of tactical organization the Zebras appeared well ahead of Nigeria and more comfortable in their approach, as they should be, considering Keshi is only just beginning the search for his best formation and players.

4. While manager Stanley Tshosane must take comfort in Botswana's defensive performance, his counterattacking strategy fell well short. While it had pace, with multiple players breaking out of defence, the quality of movement, hold-up play and passing was pedestrian, and left the Nigerian defence untroubled for much of the match. The result was that a central defensive pairing lacking pace on the left was barely tested...

5. On the Nigerian side, the ultimate test in this match was always going to be in attack rather than defence. It was always going to come down to the performance of the team in the final third, and how to address the challenge of creating quality chances in the face of a packed defence.

6. While several chances were created in open play, especially in the first half, they were either not taken, saved by the goalkeeper or stopped by some last ditch defending.

7. Again predictably, Nigeria's best chances came from wide play, with Taiwo repeatedly able to stretch play on the left. Conversely, the right side produced little, hamstrung by Ambrose's limitations as a fullback, and the curious decision to play Joel Obi in right midfield.

8. As an attacking threat in the first half, Ike Uche's movement in dropping into the hole behind Botswana's midfield, repeatedly troubled the Zebras, and provided the hold-up play that enabled Taiwo push forward, wide on the left.

9. Sadly there was little corresponding movement either from his strike partner Ehiosun or from midfield in pushing into the box, especially from Kalu. This would change briefly in the second half on the entry of Nosa Igiebor, but his initial control would let him down when presented with an opportunity.

10. The second half would produce more of the same, with Ahmed Musa's entry typically bringing new energy from the flanks, as well as clear signs of improvement in his final delivery. Nigeria must find more creative ways of using Ahmed Musa, rather than have him simply run down the flanks.

11. His pace, technique and overall dynamism is a powerful tool in unbalancing a deep and well structured defence. The challenge for Nigeria is to explore ways to bring greater creativity in the design of play around him and especially to constantly vary the zones in which Musa recieves the ball as well as deploy his pace in attacking the deep over the top ball, from the blind side of the centerbacks.

12. In midfield, the use of four natural midfielders (depending on how you class Kalu Uche), including the physical dominance of Dickson Etuhu and Fengor Ogude, brought increased balance to the Nigerian team. However, and as aforementioned, the decision to use Joel Obi on the right constrained creativity, with the occassional tilt of team shape towards the left as his natural instincts pulled him centrally. What is more, his absence on the left, often led to the zone behind Taiwo vulnerable to the counterattack.

13. Overall the formation and especially the presence of Dickson Etuhu and Fengor Ogude offered greater defensive integrity in the non-possession phase. However, suprisingly, given their dominance, the team opted not to press high upfield, a factor which kept Botswana in the game as a counterattacking threat. The Nigerian team remains vulnerable to the counterattack.

14. Conversely, while Nigeria dominated possession in central midfield, it offered little as an attacking threat from this zone in the final third. The switch of formation to a 4-3-3 would increase fluidity, but except for the aforementioned effort of Nosa Igiebor, there appeared to be no design for players to push into the last third from central midfield, which in turn left the team one dimensional in attack. This is hoping Nosa gets more playing time in the team as he offers a different dynamic.

Verdict:

Nigeria: A work in progress. Dissapointed not to see NPL hotshot Jude Aneke; hopefully next game...

Botswana: Will prove difficult to beat at the ANC, and if they iron out the kinks on the counterattack, could raise a few eyebrows.

 

 

NIGERIA: 1. Vincent ENYEAMA 13. Yusuf AYILA 3. Taye TAIWO 2. Joseph YOBO (c) 5. Efe AMBROSE; 20. Dickson Etuhu, 6. Fegor OGUDE 4. Joel OBI 12. Kalu UCHE; 15. Ike UCHE 17. Ekigho EHIOSUN

SUBS: 16. Austin EJIDE 7. Brown IDEYE 9. Emmanuel EMENIKE 10. Jude ANEKE 11. Nosa IGIEBOR 14. Dele ADELEYE 18. Ahmed MUSA 19. Gege SORIOLA 21 Elderson ECHIEJILE 22. Ugo UKAH

From Siasia to Keshi: Past, Present and Future of the Super Eagles

Twelve months and six days after the hiring of Samson Siasia, Nigeria has a new coach in Stephen Keshi, former national team captain and the progenitor of the most successful generation of Nigerian footballers.

Congratulations to Stephen 'The Big Boss' Keshi....

I first met Stephen Keshi as one of his legion of fans in Benin while in the company of a friend, the late Bunmi Akinpelumi, one of the best human beings I ever had the privilege of meeting. Since then I have followed both his playing and coaching career.

He arrives on the job with experience from coaching Togo and Mali, each of which he led to the ANC. He also brings to the assignment considerable leadership qualities and a large personality which should hold him in good stead in working with both players, administrators and the media.

He inherits a team which, although it failed to qualify for the ANC, is in much better stage of development than his predecessor was bequeathed. Overall he inherits a younger team, a more mobile and faster team, and which creates more chances per game than previously.

In midfield, several key young players have been integrated into what was a staid and stale midfield, such as Joel Obi and Fengor Ogude and Ahmed Musa; while in attack, both Ideye Brown and Emenike are fast settling into the team. With FIFA's approval of change in nationality petition, both Victor Moses and Shola Ameobi are now available to the Super Eagles, while the Arsenal protege Chuks Aneke has signified interest.

Conversely, the team continues to struggle in defence, with Efe Ambrose inconsistent in central defence, the right back position still lacking in quality players, while in goal, there is little competition for places.

In terms of recruitment of players not enough effort is being made to ensure the availability of diaspora Nigerians for selection, with Angelo Ogbonna now committed to Italy and the cases of Leverkusen midfielder Sidney Sam and Manchester City defender Nedum Onuoha now stalled.

As stated in several articles here, the team continues to show clear evidence of a tactical imbalance with poor organization in the non-possession phase of the game, especially in wide areas. In possession the team is not nearly strong enough, with players repeatedly losing possession in dangerous areas and at key moments of the game.

This is the team Stephen Keshi inherits as Super Eagles head coach with the Nations Cup competition and World Cup quater-finals as his benchmarks. While the NFF and its Technical Department deserve commendation for the timeliness of its decision making and willingness to hold coaches accountable, you have to wonder about the wisdom behind setting short term targets for a team that requires fundamental change. But time will tell...

If the evidence of history is an indication of the future, Keshi's past record in coaching Togo and Mali provide us with enough body of work to assess the future of the Super Eagles under him.

When a team plays it leaves tactical footprints on the ground which provide a window into the mind of its coach. In both countries, the tactical organization of Keshi's teams appeared loosely cobbled together and lacked both clear intent and detail.

In attack, the movement of players looked haphazard, and especially with Mali, there seemed a lack of clear definition in the movement of players in the attacking third in support of top striker Freddie Kanoute.

In midfield, the team looked diffident where it had the players to be much more proactive, especially in the non-possession phase. Likewise in defence, on loss of possession the team was neither organized into a defensive shield nor did it push up to execute a high pressing system. The defensive formation was not zonal an appeared to be based on man marking.

The lack of clear tactical organization was especially painfully obvious in the 0-2 home loss to a depleted Ghanaian team in the 2010 world cup qualifiers.

But at the same time, both his teams appeared highly motivated, the best example being Togo's world cup qualifying team around which a huge national fervor had developed, and which he Keshi had tapped from in developing team spirit.

The challenges before him in rebuilding the Super Eagles are as follows:

1. How best to address the tactical imbalance in the formation of the Super Eagles, especially by identifying the most appropriate formation for the team and the players who are best suited to execute play within such a tactical framework.

Samson Siasia's 4-2-3-1 was repeatedly compromised by its use of three forwards in front of two deep lying central midfielders and had the occassional tendency to morph into a 4-2-4, with the players lacking the tactical discipline and work rate to ensure the defensive integrity of the team in the non-possession phase. The most obvious culprit in this regard was Obinna Nsofor whose lack of game intelligence (even with his talent) is at times physically painful to watch!

2. Determine how best to reinforce Siasia's efforts at recruiting new players, especially from amongst the diaspora Nigerians, as well as the NPL, both for the short and long term period.

This would include the urgent need to:

- develop new options at central defence by trying out new players using the FIFA window for international friendlies.

- bring greater competition to the goalkeeping position and develop new options such as Carl Ikeme at Middlesboro.

- identify new options for the right back with the talent and quality to make a successful transition to international football.

3. Determine how best to integrate the best prospects from both the last U20 team and the current U-23 team into the Super Eagles.

4. Determine how best to ensure professionalism in both the players and technical staff as well as the administrators whose work directly impact the on-field performance of the team.

As I said here, the sad reality is that a Nigerian-born coach of the Super Eagles is not accorded the same respect and deference as his foriegn counterpart. He thus must fight for his right to succeed at his job; he must show clear evidence of knowledge of the game to be able to win the confidence of his players, either directly or through his team of assistants.

The biggest challenge for Keshi is thus to ensure professionalism in his management of the Super Eagles, including the performance of his assistants, some of whom it has to be said, bear doubtful competencies.

Why is City Trying Kolo Toure?

This is what we know for a fact:

1. Kolo Toure was found guilty of using a banned substance.

2. He was subsequently banned by the English FA for 6-months, beginning in March and has thus completed his punishment.

3. His ban was limited to six months where the FA could've banned him for up to two years, having recognized the infraction to be the product of a genuine mistake, and was neither a performance enhancing drug or an attempt by him to mask drug use.

4. What is more, he had excellent character references from his previous club Arsenal, including Arsene Wenger (Link).

5. According to a report in the Daily Star, the suspicion is that the club's action is motivated by fear of a backlash from Carloz Tevez's camp. 

6. Indeed no less a person as PFA chief executive Gordon Taylor has expresses suprise at City's decision to hold a hearing on this issue:

“We presented the fact that the FA could have given him two years but only gave him six months because they took into account that it was a genuine mistake and not performance-enhancing or a diuretic to mask drug-taking.

“He also had excellent character references from Arsenal and a number of other players.

“It just seems strange that after being welcomed back to the club, reinstated as captain for Carling Cup matches, that someone has come up with this hearing.

“Instead of sending out a message that this is someone who has made a mistake and served his punishment already, they are now taking action against him again (Link).

7. It seems truly strange that having stood by Kolo Toure to the extent of fully honoring his contract during his suspension that Manchester City would now turn round to slap the player with a disciplinary hearing with the possibility of a hefty fine or loss of image rights. Such an under-handed action is especially odious given the fact the PFA is powerless to intervene as the case involves a failed drugs test.

8. So I ask again: 'why is Manchester City trying Kolo Toure?

9. Form is temporary, class is permanent...